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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a life-cycle model in which a household faces stochastic health depreciation and
chooses consumption, health expenditure, and the allocation of its wealth between bonds, stocks, and
housing. The model is calibrated to explain the cross-sectional variation and the joint dynamics of
health expenditure, health, and wealth for females, aged 65 or older, in the Health and Retirement
Study. The calibrated model implies that the welfare gain from relaxing borrowing constraints on home
equity is 5 percent of wealth at age 65. Similarly, the welfare gain from private annuitization is 16
percent of wealth at age 65.
Motohiro Yogo






As a large cohort of baby boomers approach retirement, the design of products that ensure
lifetime ﬁnancial security is at the forefront of the agenda in the retail ﬁnancial and insurance
industries. In public policy, there are various proposals for reforming Social Security and
Medicare, and their impact on private saving and the demand for health care remain un-
clear. Despite enormous practical interest, there is relatively little academic work on health
expenditure and saving decisions in retirement when households face health risk, compared
to the large literature that studies consumption and saving decisions in the working phase
when households face labor-income risk. This paper is an attempt to ﬁll this gap in the
life-cycle literature.
I develop a life-cycle model in which a household faces stochastic health depreciation,
which aﬀects its marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy. The household receives
retirement income (including Social Security) and chooses consumption, health expenditure,
and the allocation of its wealth between bonds, stocks, and housing to maximize its lifetime
utility that includes a bequest motive. The key inputs into the life-cycle model are the
dynamics of health and health insurance (including Medicare), which aﬀects the price of
health care relative to non-health consumption.
I estimate the dynamics of health using data on health care utilization, health status, and
mortality for females, aged 65 or older, in the Health and Retirement Study. I also estimate
health insurance coverage using data on out-of-pocket versus total health expenditure. Given
these inputs, the life-cycle model produces cross-sectional variation in health expenditure and
wealth that is consistent with a number of key empirical facts. First, out-of-pocket health
expenditure, as a share of income, falls in health and rises in age. Second, ﬁnancial and
housing wealth, as a share of total wealth that includes the present value of retirement
income, rises in both health and age. Third, the portfolio share in stocks rises in both health
and age. Finally, the portfolio share in housing rises in health for older households and falls
in age.
The life-cycle model also produces joint dynamics of health and wealth that is consistent
with the empirical evidence. In the data, households in good or better health reduce ﬁnan-PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 3
cial and housing wealth by 21 percent on average when their health declines to poor. A
decomposition of this reduction in wealth shows that ﬁnancial wealth accounts for 10 per-
cent, while housing wealth accounts for 11 percent. For households in very good or better
health, relatively small health shocks have essentially no impact on ﬁnancial and housing
wealth.
I use the calibrated life-cycle model as a laboratory for two quantitative experiments. The
ﬁrst experiment relaxes borrowing constraints on home equity. For a household in good
health at age 65, the welfare gain from relaxed borrowing constraints is 5 percent of ﬁnancial
and housing wealth. The second experiment allows households to privately annuitize wealth,
beyond what is implicitly annuitized through Social Security and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
plans. For a household in good health at age 65, the welfare gain from private annuitization
is 16 percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth. These ﬁndings imply the presence of signiﬁcant
frictions, whether technological or psychological, that may be overcome through ﬁnancial
education, the design of better ﬁnancial products, or public policy reform.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops a life-cycle model of
consumption and portfolio choice in retirement. Section II measures the key inputs and
outputs of the life-cycle model using the Health and Retirement Study. Section III uses
simulations from the life-cycle model to explain the cross-sectional variation and the joint
dynamics of health expenditure, health, and wealth in the data. Section IV examines the
welfare implications of relaxing portfolio constraints in the life-cycle model. Section V con-
cludes with a discussion of potentially interesting extensions for future work.
I. A Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Portfolio Choice in Retirement
This section develops a life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice in retirement.
The basic structure of the life-cycle model can be summarized as follows. An individual
enters retirement with an initial endowment of health, ﬁnancial wealth, and housing wealth.
In each period while alive, the household faces stochastic health depreciation, which aﬀects
its marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy. In response to the health shock, the
household chooses consumption, housing expenditure, health expenditure, and the allocation4
of ﬁnancial wealth between bonds and stocks. Upon death, the household leaves ﬁnancial
and housing wealth as a bequest.
The life-cycle model in this paper allows health expenditure, wealth, and its allocation
between bonds, stocks, and housing to all respond endogenously to health shocks. Individual
features of the model have appeared in the life-cycle literature. For example, Gabriel Picone,
Martin Uribe and R. Mark Wilson (1998) allow health expenditure to respond endogenously
to health shocks, but they do not model housing or portfolio choice. A number of authors
study housing and portfolio choice during the working phase when households face labor-
income risk, instead of retirement when they face health risk (Jo˜ ao F. Cocco 2005, Xiaoqing
Hu 2005, Rui Yao and Harold H. Zhang 2005). Finally, a number of authors study portfolio
choice between bonds, stocks, and annuities in the context of a life-cycle model in which
health expenditure and mortality are exogenous (Ryan D. Edwards 2008, Wolfram J. Horneﬀ,
Raimond H. Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell and Michael Z. Stamos 2009, Gaobo Pang and Mark
Warshawsky 2010).
A. Housing Expenditure
The household enters each period t with an initial housing stock Dt−1. The level of the
housing stock incorporates both the size and the quality of the home. Housing depreciates
at a constant rate δ ∈ [0,1) in each period. After depreciation, the household chooses
housing expenditure Et, which can be negative in the case of downsizing. Whenever housing
expenditure is diﬀerent from zero, the household incurs a transaction cost of τ(1−δ)PtDt−1,
where τ ∈ [0,1) and Pt is the home price. The presence of a transaction cost that is
proportional to home value makes housing expenditure lumpy. The accumulation equation
for housing is
Dt =( 1− δ)Dt−1 + Et. (1)
Housing is a unique asset that serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, the household
enjoys a utility ﬂow from living in a home. On the other hand, housing is a form of savings,PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 5
which the household can use for consumption or health expenditure while alive and bequeath
upon death. For example, a household that develops a physical disability can sell its home
and use the proceeds to pay for nursing home care.
B. Health Expenditure
Analogous to housing, I model the household’s health as an accumulation process (Michael
Grossman 1972). The household enters each period t with an initial health stock Ht−1.
Health depreciates at a stochastic rate ωt ≤ 1 in each period t. As discussed in further
detail below, the distribution of ωt depends on the household’s state variables in period t,
including previous health. For example, whether you get a heart attack today is purely
chance, but the likelihood of getting a heart attack depends on whether you have a history
of heart disease. The household dies if ωt = 1, that is, if its health depreciates entirely. The
household’s maximum possible lifetime is T so that ωT+1 = 1 with certainty.
After the realization of health depreciation in period t, the household chooses health ex-
penditure It ≥ 0 if still alive. Health expenditure is an investment in the sense that its
impact on health can persist for more than one period. Health investment is irreversible in
the sense that the household cannot reduce its health through negative expenditure. Irre-
versibility of investment is a key economic feature that makes health fundamentally diﬀerent
from ﬁnancial assets or housing.
The accumulation equation for health is




This speciﬁcation for health production has two key features that are well suited for empirical
analysis. First, health production is homogeneous in the health stock. Second, there are
decreasing returns to health investment, captured by the parameter ψ ∈ (0,1] (Isaac Ehrlich
and Hiroyuki Chuma 1990). Decreasing returns is a simple way to model the fact that
treatment when unhealthy has a much larger impact on health than preventive care when
healthy.6
C. Budget and Portfolio Constraints
The household enters each period t with wealth Wt, which is the sum of ﬁnancial wealth
and the present value of retirement income (i.e., Social Security and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
plans). As discussed in further detail below, I model retirement income as a distribution
from a non-traded real annuity. The household uses wealth for consumption Ct,h o u s i n g
expenditure Et at the relative price Pt, and health expenditure It at the relative price Qt.A s
discussed in further detail below, the relative price of health care accounts for the household’s
health insurance coverage.
Wealth remaining after consumption and expenditures can be saved in either bonds or
stocks. Let A1,t denote savings in bonds in period t, and let A2,t denote savings in stocks.
Similarly, let A3,t denote the present value of retirement income. Let 1{Et =0} denote an
indicator function that is equal to one if housing expenditure is diﬀerent from zero in period
t. The household’s savings in period t is
3  
n=1
An,t = Wt − Ct − PtEt − τ1{Et =0}(1 − δ)PtDt−1 − QtIt. (3)






Deﬁne total wealth as the sum of ﬁnancial wealth, the present value of retirement income,
and housing wealth:
  Wt = Wt +
 
1 − τ1{Et =0}
 
(1 − δ)PtDt−1. (5)
Deﬁne savings in housing wealth as AD,t = PtDt. Combined with the accumulation equationPORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 7
for housing (1), the household’s total savings in period t is
3  
n=1
An,t + AD,t =   Wt − Ct − QtIt. (6)





I can rewrite the intertemporal budget constraint as









Bonds have a constant gross rate of return R1,t+1 = R1. The average real return on the
one-year Treasury bond, deﬂated by the consumer price index for all items less medical care,
was 2.5 percent for the period 1958–2008. I therefore set R1 =1 .025 annually.
For tractability, I model a mortgage or a home equity loan as a short position in bonds. The
household can borrow up to A1,t ≥− λAD,t in each period t,w h e r eλ =0 .2 in the benchmark
model. This low borrowing limit is based on evidence that older retired households have
diﬃculty borrowing from their home equity, compared to younger working households (Todd
Sinai and Nicholas S. Souleles 2008). Section IV examines the welfare implications of relaxing
this borrowing constraint.
Stocks
Stocks have a stochastic gross rate of return
(9) R2,t+1 = R2ν2,t+1,8
where logν2,t+1 ∼ N(−σ2
2/2,σ 2
2) is independently and identically distributed. The real return
on the Center for Research in Securities Prices value-weighted stock index, deﬂated by the
consumer price index for all items less medical care, had a mean of 7 percent and a standard
deviation of 18 percent for the period 1958–2008. Based on these estimates, I set R2 =1 .065
and σ2 =0 .18 annually. An equity premium of 4 percent, which is slightly lower than its
historical estimate of 4.5 percent, is a common assumption in life-cycle models of portfolio
choice (Jo˜ ao F. Cocco, Francisco J. Gomes and Pascal J. Maenhout 2005). The household
cannot short stocks, so that it faces the portfolio constraint A2,t ≥ 0 in each period t.
Real Annuity
For convenience, I model retirement income as a distribution from a non-traded real annu-
ity, under the assumption that Social Security and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans are indexed
to the consumer price index. Let a unit of the annuity be a claim that pays oﬀ one unit
of consumption in every period prior to death. Let pt denote the actuarially fair survival
probability in period t, which is a deterministic function of gender, birth cohort, and age.
















R3/pt+1 if ωt+1  =1
0i f ωt+1 =1
. (11)
To calibrate the annuity price, I use the survival probabilities for females born in the 1940
cohort from the Social Security life tables (Felicitie C. Bell and Michael L. Miller 2005,
Table 7). I set the maximum possible age in the life-cycle model to 119 to match the
maximum age in the life tables. I set R3 =1 .025 annually to match the riskless interest ratePORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 9
in the life-cycle model.
Let B3,t denote the retirement income in period t, so that savings in the annuity is A3,t =
P3,tB3,t. In the benchmark model, the household receives a constant stream of retirement
income through Social Security and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans, which is equivalent to the
portfolio constraint B3,t = B3,0 in each period t. Section IV examines the welfare implications
of allowing the household to privately annuitize wealth, which is equivalent to relaxing the
portfolio constraint to be B3,t ≥ B3,t−1.
Housing
Housing has a stochastic gross rate of return
RD,t+1 = RDνD,t+1, (12)
where logνD,t+1 ∼ N(−σ2
D/2,σ 2
D) is independently and identically distributed. The dynam-
ics of the relative price of housing is then governed by equation (7), where the initial price
level is normalized to P1 = 1. Based on equation (7), I compute housing return using the
Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight price index and a depreciation rate of 1.14
percent for private residential ﬁxed assets. The real housing return, deﬂated by the con-
sumer price index for all items less medical care, had a mean of 0.4 percent and a standard
deviation of 3.5 percent for the period 1976–2008. I therefore set RD =1 .004 and σD =0 .035
annually.
D. Objective Function
If the household is alive in period t, it has utility ﬂow from consumption, housing, and
health. Its utility ﬂow over consumption and housing is given by the Cobb-Douglas function.

















The parameter φ ∈ (0,1) is the utility weight on housing, and α ∈ (0,1) is the utility weight
on health. The parameter ρ ∈ (0,1] is the elasticity of substitution between non-health
consumption and health.
If the household dies in period t, it bequeathes ﬁnancial and housing wealth. Its utility
ﬂow over the bequest is
G
 
  Wt,P t
 






The parameter u>0 determines the strength of the bequest motive. This speciﬁcation
is the indirect utility function that corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas function over ﬁnancial




t ). It captures the notion that ﬁnancial wealth and
housing are not perfectly substitutable forms of bequest (see Yao and Zhang (2005) for a
similar approach).
Let 1{ωt+1=1} denote an indicator function that is equal to one if the household dies in












  Wt+1,P t+1
 1−γ (1−1/σ)/(1−γ) 1/(1−1/σ)
,
where the terminal value is J
1−γ
T+1 = 0 (Larry G. Epstein and Stanley E. Zin 1991). The
parameter β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. The parameter σ>0 is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, and γ>1 is relative risk aversion.
If ρ<σ , non-health consumption and health are complements in the sense that the
marginal utility of non-health consumption rises in health. For example, the marginal utility
of a ﬁne meal may be low if you have diabetes. If ρ>σ , non-health consumption and health
are substitutes. For example, the marginal utility of cable television may be high if you have
a physical disability. The complementarity between non-health consumption and health alsoPORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 11
captures the fact that the composition of consumption may change with respect to health.
E. Homogeneity in Total Wealth
In addition to age, the state variables of the life-cycle model are health, retirement income,
the housing stock, the home price, and total wealth. However, homogeneity of the objective
function allows me to eliminate total wealth as a state variable. I redeﬁne the state variables
of the life-cycle model as their values relative to total wealth:












Homogeneity is a common assumption in life-cycle models of consumption and portfolio
choice, which simpliﬁes the model to make it suitable for empirical analysis. In order to
preserve homogeneity, I make two additional parametric assumptions. First, the distribution
of health depreciation ωt+1 depends on present health only through   Ht. Second, the relative
price of health care, or health insurance coverage, depends on present health only through
  Ht. In Section II, I estimate the distribution of health depreciation and the relative price of
health care in the Health and Retirement Study.
Let   Ct = Ct/  Wt,   It = QtIt/  Wt,a n d   An,t = An,t/  Wt for each asset n =1 ,2,3,D.Ir e s c a l e
the intratemporal budget constraint (6) as
3  
n=1
  An,t +   AD,t =1−   Ct −   It. (19)







Rn,t+1   An,t +
 
1 − τ1{  AD,t =  Dt}
 
RD,t+1   AD,t. (20)12
Combining these two budget constraints, I eliminate   A1,t as a policy variable:
ΔWt+1 =R1,t+1
 





(Rn,t+1 − R1,t+1)   An,t (21)
+
 
1 − τ1{  AD,t =  Dt}
 
(RD,t+1 − R1,t+1)   AD,t.
Similarly, I rescale the utility function (13) as
  Ut =
U(Ct,D t,H t)
  Wt




















  It/   Ht
 ψ 










I also rescale the bequest function (14) as
  Gt =
G
 









I am now ready to restate the household’s problem as follows. In each period t,t h e
household chooses   Ct,   It,a n d   An,t (n =2 ,3,D) to maximize its objective function:














1{ωt+1 =1}   J
1−γ
t+1 +1 {ωt+1=1}   G
1−γ
t+1
  (1−1/σ)/(1−γ) 1/(1−1/σ)
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The budget and portfolio constraints are
  Ct +   It +   A2,t +   A3,t +( 1− λ)   AD,t ≤1, (26)
  A3,t =  B3,t. (27)
The law of motion for the state variables are
  Ht+1 =









  Dt+1 =
RD,t+1   AD,t
ΔWt+1
, (29)
  B3,t+1 =




II. Calibrating the Life-Cycle Model Using the Health and Retirement Study
The Health and Retirement Study is a panel survey designed to study the health and wealth
dynamics of the elderly in the United States. The data consist of eight waves, covering every
two years between 1992 and 2006. This section explains how I use the data to measure the
key inputs (i.e., health transition probabilities and health insurance coverage) and outputs
(i.e., health expenditure, wealth, and asset allocation) of the life-cycle model. Appendix A
contains details on the construction of the relevant variables for my analysis.
A. Sample of Households
My sample consists of households whose female respondent is born 1891–1940, aged 65 or
older, and retired (including disabled or out of labor force) at the time of interview. The
choice of females is motivated by the fact that they live longer, which leads to a larger sample
of older households. The sample includes the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among
the Oldest Old (born before 1924), the Children of Depression (born 1924–1930), and the14
initial HRS cohort (born 1931–1941). Households must have both positive income and net
worth to be included in the sample.
The life-cycle model in this paper applies to single households, or to previously married
households once they are widowed or divorced. Because the female respondent is typically
married at the time of ﬁrst interview, I must make some measurement assumptions in cali-
brating the life-cycle model. I measure health outcomes for the female respondent only, while
I measure health expenses, income, and wealth at the household level. All of my empirical
speciﬁcations control for marital status to account for potential diﬀerences between single
and married households. I use the predicted values for single households to calibrate the
life-cycle model.1
The Health and Retirement Study continues to interview respondents that enter nursing
homes. However, any respondent that enters a nursing home receives a zero sampling weight
because these weights are based on the non-institutionalized population of the Current Pop-
ulation Survey. Therefore, the use of sampling weights would lead me to underestimate the
cost of nursing home care, which accounts for a signiﬁcant share of out-of-pocket health
expenditure in old age. Therefore, I do not use sampling weights in my analysis.
B. Health Problems and Health Care Utilization
The primary measure of health for my study is self-reported general health status. At
each interview, the respondent reports whether her health is poor, fair, good, very good, or
excellent. Insofar as health enters the household’s utility function, self-reported health status
is a relevant measure of health for calibrating the life-cycle model. As shown below, self-
reported health status is highly correlated with doctor-diagnosed health problems, diﬃculty
with activities of daily living, health care utilization, and future mortality.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the share of respondents who have ever had doctor-diagnosed
health problems, separately by health status. The table shows that health status is highly
1An alternative approach, employed in an previous version of this paper, is to focus on the sub-sample
of single households. The drawback of this approach is smaller sample size because households would only
enter this sub-sample as they are widowed or divorced.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 15
correlated with all measures of physical and mental health (Robert B. Wallace and A. Reg-
ula Herzog 1995). For example, 54 percent of respondents in poor health have had heart
problems, which is higher than 39 percent of those in fair health, 26 percent of those in good
health, 15 percent of those in very good health, and 9 percent of those in excellent health.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the share of respondents who have some diﬃculty with activities
of daily living at the time of interview, separately by health status. The table shows that
health status is highly correlated with all measures of functional limitation. For example, 43
percent of respondents in poor health have some diﬃculty dressing, which is higher than 19
percent of those in fair health, 9 percent of those in good health, 4 percent of those in very
good health, and 3 percent of those in excellent health.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the share of respondents who have used health care in the two
years prior to the interview, separately by health status. The table shows that health status
is highly correlated with the use of home health care, nursing home stay, and prescription
drugs. For example, 34 percent of respondents in poor health have used home health care in
the two years prior to the interview, which is higher than 17 percent of those in fair health,
9 percent of those in good health, 5 percent of those in very good health, and 3 percent of
those in excellent health. Similarly, 19 percent of respondents in poor health have stayed
at a nursing home in the two years prior to the interview, which is higher than 8 percent
of those in fair health, 5 percent of those in good health, 3 percent of those in very good
health, and 2 percent of those in excellent health. The fact that respondents in poor health
are more likely to use home health care and to stay at a nursing home is consistent with
higher incidences of functional limitation among these respondents.
C. Measuring the Inputs of the Life-Cycle Model
Health Transition Probabilities
Let H∗
t denote the respondent’s self-reported health status at each interview. I model
health status as a function of unobserved health   Ht through the following response function16





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0D e a d i f   Ht <h 1
1P o o r i f h1 ≤   Ht <h 2
2F a i r i f h2 ≤   Ht <h 3
3 Good if h3 ≤   Ht <h 4
4 Very good if h4 ≤   Ht <h 5
5 Excellent if h5 ≤   Ht
. (31)
I use an ordered probit model to estimate how future health status at two years from the
present interview depends on present health status, age, total wealth, measures of health
care utilization, vigorous physical activity, smoking, marital status, and birth cohort. I
interact the measures of health care utilization with health status to allow for the possibility
that the marginal product of health care varies with health. I control for total wealth since
the relevant measure of health for the life-cycle model is the variation in health that is
independent of total wealth (i.e.,   Ht).
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the ordered
probit model. The sign of the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the direction of the marginal
eﬀects for the likelihood of the extreme health outcomes, namely death and excellent health.
Present health status is a signiﬁcant predictor of future health status. The negative coeﬃ-
cients for poor and fair health imply that these respondents are more likely to die prior to
the next interview, compared to those in good health. Conversely, the positive coeﬃcients
for very good and excellent health imply that these respondents are less likely to die. The
negative coeﬃcient for age implies that older respondents are more likely to die. The positive
coeﬃcient for total wealth implies that wealthier respondents are less likely to die, holding
everything else constant.
Measures of health care utilization that are positive and signiﬁcant predictors of future
health status are a dentist visit and a cholesterol test. Measures of health care utilization
that are positive but insigniﬁcant predictors of future health status are a doctor visit, out-PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 17
patient surgery, and a mammogram. For both a doctor visit and outpatient surgery, the
coeﬃcient on their interaction with poor health is positive, which implies that health care
has a larger impact on future health for respondents that are already in poor health. Home
health care, nursing home stay, and prescription drugs predict future health status with
a negative coeﬃcient, which is likely due to an omitted variables bias as discussed below.
In addition to health care utilization, I examine vigorous physical activity and smoking as
non-monetary measures of health investment. Vigorous physical activity is a positive and
signiﬁcant predictor of future health status, while smoking is a negative and signiﬁcant pre-
dictor. A joint Wald test for measures of health care utilization, vigorous physical activity,
smoking, and their interaction with health status rejects strongly. Taken together, this ev-
idence suggests that the choices that respondents make regarding health investment have a
signiﬁcant impact on their future health.
Respondents in poor health are more likely to use health care. Therefore, the coeﬃcients
for health care utilization are potentially downward biased, insofar as health care utilization
is negatively correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in health. To investigate this possi-
bility, column (2) of Table 2 introduces doctor-diagnosed health problems and diﬃculty with
activities of daily living as additional measures of present health. These additional mea-
sures are signiﬁcant predictors of future health status, implying that present health status
does not fully capture heterogeneity in health. The coeﬃcients for health care utilization in
column (2) are generally higher than those in column (1). For example, prescription drugs
have a statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of −1.56 in column (2), which is higher than the
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of −17.58 in column (1). Because this evidence implies the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in health, Table 7 below takes an alternative approach
by examining the data in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
I use the estimates from column (1) of Table 2 to compute the predicted probabilities
for single females who were born 1931–1940, have the average total wealth for her cohort
and age, have not used health care in the two years prior to the interview, and does not
regularly participate in vigorous physical activity and smokes at the time of interview. In18
other words, I estimate the counterfactual of how health status transitions from the present
interview to the next in the absence of health investment. Figure 1 reports the predicted
transition probabilities by present health status and age. The ﬁgure shows that health
status is persistent and that present health is a signiﬁcant predictor of future mortality.
Conditional on being in poor health at any given age, death is the most likely outcome at
the next interview. Conditional on being in excellent health at any given age, death is the
least likely outcome at the next interview.
Let Pr(H∗
t+1 = j|H∗
t = i) denote the predicted transition probability, from health status
i in period t to health status j in period t + 1, in the absence of health investment. For a
respondent whose present health is hi ≤   Ht <h i+1, health depreciation in period t +1i s
1 − ωt+1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 with probability Pr(H∗
t+1 =0 |H∗
t = i)
h1/hi with probability Pr(H∗
t+1 =1 |H∗
t = i)
h2/hi with probability Pr(H∗
t+1 =2 |H∗
t = i)
h3/hi with probability Pr(H∗
t+1 =3 |H∗
t = i)
h4/hi with probability Pr(H∗
t+1 =4 |H∗
t = i)




Relative Price of Health Care
Virtually all households in the sample report health insurance coverage through Medicare,
Medicaid, or an employer-provided health plan. Nevertheless, households report signiﬁcant
out-of-pocket health expenditure, especially in old age, which can arise for a number of
reasons. Medicare does not cover nursing home care, and Medicaid only covers a limited and
capped amount of nursing home care for those that qualify. In addition, households may
choose out-of-network or higher quality care that is not covered by their health insurance.
For each household at each interview, I compute the out-of-pocket expenditure share as
the ratio of out-of-pocket to total health expenditure. I use a censored regression model
to estimate how the out-of-pocket expenditure share depends on health status, age and its
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status, and birth cohort. I then compute the predicted values for single females who were
born 1931–1940 and have the average total wealth for her cohort and age. Let qt(H∗
t )d e n o t e
the predicted out-of-pocket expenditure share for health status H∗
t in period t. I model the





The ﬁrst part accounts for the secular growth in the relative price of health care. The average
log growth rate of the consumer price index for medical care, relative to that for all items less
medical care, was 1.9 percent for the period 1958–2008. I therefore set q =0 .019 annually.
The second part accounts for health insurance coverage at the household level.
Figure 2 reports the relative price of health care by health status and age. The relative
price of health care rises in health, especially for younger households. For example, the
relative price of health care is 0.35 for households in poor health at age 65, which is lower
than 0.47 for those in excellent health. The fact that health insurance has better coverage
for the unhealthy is consistent with the existence of copays and deductibles. The relative
price of health care grows rapidly in old age. Part of this growth is explained by an out-of-
pocket expenditure share that rises in age. For households in good health, the out-of-pocket
expenditure share is 0.54 at age 77, which is lower than 0.60 at age 89. The remainder of
the growth is explained by the secular growth in the relative price of health care.
D. Measuring the Outputs of the Life-Cycle Model
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure
In Table 3, I use a linear regression model to estimate how the logarithm of out-of-pocket
health expenditure, as a share of income, depends on health status, age and its interaction
with health status, total wealth and its interaction with health status, marital status, and
birth cohort. Out-of-pocket health expenditure is 21 percent higher for households in poor
health at age 65, compared to those in good health. For households in good health, out-20
of-pocket health expenditure rises by 65 percent for every ten years in age. The negative
coeﬃcient for the interaction of age with excellent health implies that out-of-pocket health
expenditure rises less rapidly in age for households in excellent health.
To facilitate the comparison of the data with simulations from the life-cycle model, Panel A
of Table 4 reports the predicted out-of-pocket health expenditure, as a share of income, by
health status and age. The reported estimates are for single females who were born 1931–
1940 and have the average total wealth for her cohort and age. The table does not extend
beyond age 89 because sample attrition through death makes such extrapolation potentially
unreliable. The key targets for the life-cycle model are that out-of-pocket health expenditure
falls in health and rises in age. Households in poor health at age 65 spend 9 percent of their
income on health care, which is higher than 7 percent for those in excellent health. Similarly,
households in poor health at age 89 spend 48 percent of their income on health care, which
is higher than 25 percent for those in excellent health. Households in good health spend 7
percent of their income on health care at age 65, which is lower than 35 percent at age 89.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the predicted health distribution by age for the same group
of households. The health distribution at age 65 is 7 percent in poor health, 20 percent in
fair health, 33 percent in good health, 30 percent in very good health, and 10 percent in
excellent health. While households in poorest health tend to die and drop out of the sample,
health declines even among healthier households that remain alive. The health distribution
at age 89 is 16 percent in poor health, 28 percent in fair health, 32 percent in good health,
19 percent in very good health, and 4 percent in excellent health.
Financial and Housing Wealth
In Table 5, I use a censored regression model to estimate how housing and ﬁnancial wealth,
as a share of total wealth that includes the present value of retirement income, depends on
health status, age and its interaction with health status, total wealth and its interaction
with health status, marital status, and birth cohort. Financial and housing wealth, as a
share of total wealth, is 4 percentage points higher for households in excellent health at age
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wealth, as a share of total wealth, rises by 12 percentage points for every ten years in age.
The negative coeﬃcient for the interaction of age with poor health implies that ﬁnancial and
housing wealth, as a share of total wealth, rises less rapidly in age for households in poor
health.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the predicted ﬁnancial and housing wealth, as a share of total
wealth, by health status and age. The reported estimates are for single females who were
born 1931–1940 and have the average total wealth for her cohort and age. The key targets
for the life-cycle model are that ﬁnancial and housing wealth, as a share of total wealth,
rises in both health and age. Financial and housing wealth is 19 percent of total wealth for
households in poor health at age 65, which is lower than 23 percent for those in excellent
health. Similarly, ﬁnancial and housing wealth is 43 percent of total wealth for households
in poor health at age 89, which is lower than 50 percent for those in excellent health. As
households age, the value of their liquid wealth rises relative the declining present value of
retirement income. For households in good health, ﬁnancial and housing wealth is 20 percent
of total wealth at age 65, which is lower than 47 percent at age 89.
In Table 6, I use a censored regression model to estimate how the allocation to stocks, as a
share of ﬁnancial and housing wealth, depends on health status, age and its interaction with
health status, total wealth and its interaction with health status, marital status, and birth
cohort. The portfolio share in stocks is positively related to health, even after controlling
for total wealth (Harvey S. Rosen and Stephen Wu 2004). The portfolio share in stocks is
4 percentage points lower for households in poor health at age 65, compared to those in
good health. The portfolio share in stocks is 2 percentage points higher for households in
excellent health at age 65, compared to those in good health. For households in good health,
the portfolio share in stocks rises by 2 percentage points for every ten years in age.
Panel E of Table 4 reports the predicted portfolio share in stocks by health status and age.
The key targets for the life-cycle model are that the portfolio share in stocks rises in both
health and age. The portfolio share in stocks is 3 percent for households in poor health at
age 65, which is lower than 8 percent for those in excellent health. Similarly, the portfolio22
share in stocks is 10 percent for households in poor health at age 89, which is lower than 12
percent for those in excellent health. For households in good health, the portfolio share in
stocks is 6 percent at age 65, which is lower than 12 percent at age 89.
In Table 6, I use a censored regression model to explain how the allocation to housing, as a
share of ﬁnancial and housing wealth, depends on health status, age and its interaction with
health status, total wealth and its interaction with health status, marital status, and birth
cohort. The coeﬃcients for health status imply the absence of a robust relation between the
portfolio share in housing and health at age 65. For households in good health, the portfolio
share in housing falls by 13 percentage points for every ten years in age. The negative
coeﬃcient for the interaction of age with poor health implies that the portfolio share in
housing falls more rapidly for households in poor health. Conversely, the positive coeﬃcient
for the interaction of age with excellent health implies that the portfolio share in housing
falls less rapidly for households in excellent health.
Panel F of Table 4 reports the predicted portfolio share in housing by health status and
age. The key targets for the life-cycle model are that the portfolio share in housing rises in
health for older households and falls in age. The portfolio share in housing is 38 percent for
households in poor health at age 89, which is lower than 53 percent for those in excellent
health. For households in good health, the portfolio share in housing is 77 percent at age
65, which is higher than 45 percent at age 89.
Since stocks account for a small share of ﬁnancial and housing wealth, Panel D of Table 4
shows that the portfolio share in bonds is essentially the mirror image of the portfolio share
in housing. In other words, the portfolio share in bonds falls in health for older households
and rises in age.
How Financial and Housing Wealth Responds to Declining Health
By documenting the cross-sectional variation in health and age, Table 5 reveals how ﬁnan-
cial and housing wealth responds to changes in health at the life-cycle frequency. Similarly,
Table 6 reveals how the allocation of ﬁnancial and housing wealth between bonds, stocks,
and housing responds to changes in health at the life-cycle frequency. This section docu-PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 23
ments how wealth and its allocation respond to changes in health at the two-year frequency,
between survey interviews.
For each household, I compute the growth rate of ﬁnancial and housing wealth from the
present interview to the next. In Table 7, I use a linear regression model to estimate how this
change in ﬁnancial and housing wealth depends on a set of dummy variables that measures
the decline in health from the present interview to the next. Households in fair or better
health reduce ﬁnancial and housing wealth by 13 percent on average when their health
declines to poor. Similarly, households in good or better health reduce ﬁnancial and housing
wealth by 8 percent when their health declines to fair or worse. Hence, the cumulative eﬀect
of declining health from good or better to poor is the sum of these two coeﬃcients, which is a
21 percent reduction in ﬁnancial and housing wealth. For households in very good or better
health, relatively small health shocks have essentially no impact on ﬁnancial and housing
wealth.
To understand the source of the reduction in ﬁnancial and housing wealth, I decompose
the growth rate of ﬁnancial and housing wealth into the sum of three parts due to bonds,
stocks, and housing:
A1,t+1 − A1,t
A1,t + A2,t + AD,t
+
A2,t+1 − A2,t
A1,t + A2,t + AD,t
+
AD,t+1 − AD,t
A1,t + A2,t + AD,t
. (34)
Bonds account for 4 percent, stocks account for essentially none, and housing accounts for 9
percent of the 13 percent reduction in wealth when health declines from fair or better. Thus,
households dissave primarily from housing wealth in response to relatively severe health
shocks. Bonds account for 5 percent, stocks account for 3 percent, and housing accounts
for essentially none of the 8 percent reduction in wealth when health declines from good or
better. Thus, households dissave from ﬁnancial wealth in response to more moderate health
shocks.24
III. Health Expenditure and Wealth in the Life-Cycle Model
Table 8 summarizes the preference and health parameters that I use to calibrate the life-
cycle model. Following a common practice in the life-cycle literature, I set the subjective
discount factor to β =0 .96 annually. The bequest motive is not well identiﬁed, separately
from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, based on the life-cycle wealth proﬁle for
typical households (ase discussed in Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French and John Bailey
Jones (2010) and John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, Steven Laufer and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
(2011)). I therefore set the bequest parameter to u = 1, which is a fairly weak bequest
motive that corresponds to one period (two years) of consumption. As discussed below, I
calibrate the remaining preference and health parameters to match targeted moments in the
data.
A. Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Policies
I solve the life-cycle model by numerical dynamic programming as described in Appendix B.
Figure 3 reports the optimal consumption and portfolio policies at age 65, as functions of the
health state   Ht. The optimal policies are in units of total wealth that includes the present
value of retirement income. My discussion will focus on the baseline policy evaluated at
  B3,t =0 .5,   Dt =0 .5, and Pt =1 .0.
Optimal consumption is increasing in health. The household consumes a lower share of
its total wealth in poor health because non-health consumption and health are complements
at the calibrated parameters (i.e., σ>ρ ). Optimal out-of-pocket health expenditure is
decreasing in health. The household spends a higher share of its total wealth on health care
in poor health because of decreasing returns to health investment (i.e., ψ<1).
The optimal portfolio share in bonds is decreasing in health, while the optimal portfolio
share in stocks is increasing in health. Because the household has shorter life expectancy in
poor health, this is analogous to the standard eﬀect that an investor with shorter horizon
should invest a lower share of its ﬁnancial wealth in stocks (Zvi Bodie, Robert C. Merton and
William F. Samuelson 1992). The optimal portfolio share in housing is increasing in health.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 25
The household consumes less housing in poor health because non-health consumption and
health are complements.
The dashed line represents the optimal policy for a higher housing stock, evaluated at
  Dt =0 .9. Any diﬀerences between this policy and the baseline policy can be interpreted as
the eﬀect of transaction costs because the housing stock would drop out as a state variable
in the absence of such costs. The optimal housing policies coincide at good or worse health,
which implies that a household in poor health is willing to pay the transaction cost to adjust
the housing stock. The optimal housing policies diﬀer at very good or better health, which
implies that a household in excellent health is unwilling to pay the transaction cost to adjust
the housing stock.
The dotted line represents the optimal policy for a higher home price, evaluated at Pt =1 .5.
The primary eﬀect of a higher home price is that the household substitutes from housing to
consumption. The substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect because consumption and
housing are substitutes at the calibrated parameters (i.e., σ<1).
I use the optimal consumption and portfolio policies to simulate a population of 100,000
households every two years from age 65 until death. I draw initial health from a lognormal
distribution (i.e., log   H1 ∼ N(μH,σ H)) to match the health distribution at age 65. I calibrate
the initial level of retirement income, conditional on health, to match the present value of
retirement income at age 65. Finally, I calibrate the initial housing stock, conditional on
health, to match housing wealth at age 65.
B. Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure
Panel A of Table 9 reports out-of-pocket health expenditure, as a share of income, by
health status and age for simulated households. The utility weight on health is an important
determinant of the level of out-of-pocket health expenditure. The returns to health invest-
ment is an important determinant of the relation between out-of-pocket health expenditure
and health. Finally, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is an important determinant
of the relation between out-of-pocket health expenditure and age.
Consistent with Panel A of Table 4, the life-cycle model generates out-of-pocket health26
expenditure that falls in health and rises in age. Households in poor health at age 65 spend
91 percent of their income on health care, which is higher than 1 percent for those in excellent
health. Similarly, households in poor health at age 89 spend 123 percent of their income
on health care, which is higher than 4 percent for those in excellent health. This relation
between out-of-pocket health expenditure and health is qualitatively consistent with the
empirical evidence, despite being more pronounced.2 Households in good health spend 12
percent of their income on health care at age 65, which is lower than 35 percent at age
89. This relation between out-of-pocket health expenditure and age matches the empirical
evidence.
Panel B of Table 9 reports the health distribution by age for simulated households. The
health distribution is jointly determined by health depreciation, whose magnitude is deter-
mined by the calibrated parameters μH and σH, and health expenditure. Consistent with
Panel B of Table 4, health declines even among healthier households that remain alive. The
health distribution at age 89 is 8 percent in poor health, 24 percent in fair health, 39 percent
in good health, 26 percent in very good health, and 4 percent in excellent health.
C. Financial and Housing Wealth
Panel C of Table 9 reports ﬁnancial and housing wealth, as a share of total wealth, by
health status and age for simulated households. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is an important determinant of the relation between wealth and age.
Consistent with Panel C of Table 4, the life-cycle model generates ﬁnancial and housing
wealth, as a share of total wealth, that rises in both health and age. Financial and housing
wealth is 15 percent of total wealth for households in poor health at age 65, which is lower
than 22 percent for those in excellent health. Similarly, ﬁnancial and housing wealth is 43
percent of total wealth for households in poor health at age 89, which is lower than 50 percent
for those in excellent health. This relation between wealth and health matches the empirical
2Lower returns to health investment (i.e., lower ψ) would better match the relation between out-of-pocket
health expenditure and health, which was the calibration in a previous version of this paper. However, lower
returns to health investment would reduce the response of ﬁnancial and housing wealth to declining health,
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evidence. For households in good health, ﬁnancial and housing wealth is 18 percent of total
wealth at age 65, which is lower than 49 percent at age 89. This relation between wealth
and age matches the empirical evidence.
Panel E of Table 9 reports the portfolio share in stocks by health status and age for
simulated households. Relative risk aversion is an important determinant of the level of
the portfolio share in stocks. The life-cycle model has diﬃculty explaining the low portfolio
share in stocks because of the high equity premium, even with relative risk aversion of ﬁve.
Fixed costs of participating in the stock market, which I have ignored in this paper for
tractability, are likely to explain the low portfolio share in stocks (Francisco Gomes and
Alexander Michaelides 2005).
Consistent with Panel E of Table 4, the portfolio share in stocks rises in both health and
age. The portfolio share in stocks is 20 percent for households in poor health at age 65,
which is lower than 34 percent for those in excellent health. Similarly, the portfolio share in
stocks is 10 percent for households in poor health at age 89, which is lower than 23 percent
for those in excellent health. This relation between the portfolio share in stocks and health
is qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence. For households in good health, the
portfolio share in stocks is 20 percent at age 65, which is lower than 37 percent at age 89.
This relation between the portfolio share in stocks and age is qualitatively consistent with
the empirical evidence.
Panel F of Table 9 reports the portfolio share in housing by health status and age for sim-
ulated households. The utility weight on housing is an important determinant of the level
of the portfolio share in housing. The elasticity of substitution between non-health con-
sumption and health is an important determinant of the relation between the portfolio share
in housing and health. Finally, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is an important
determinant of the relation between the portfolio share in housing and age.
Consistent with Panel F of Table 4, the portfolio share in housing rises in health for older
households and falls in age. The portfolio share in housing is 57 percent for households in
poor health at age 89, which is lower than 67 percent for those in excellent health. This28
relation between the portfolio share in housing and health for older households is qualitatively
consistent with the empirical evidence. For households in good health, the portfolio share
in housing is 82 percent at age 65, which is higher than 56 percent at age 89. This relation
between the portfolio share in housing and age is qualitatively consistent with the empirical
evidence.
D. How Financial and Housing Wealth Responds to Declining Health
For each simulated household, I compute the growth rate of ﬁnancial and housing wealth
from the present period to the next. In Table 10, I use a linear regression model to estimate
how this change in ﬁnancial and housing wealth depends on a set of dummy variables that
measures the decline in health from the present period to the next. Households in fair or
better health reduce ﬁnancial and housing wealth by 12 percent on average when their health
declines to poor. Similarly, households in good or better health reduce ﬁnancial and housing
wealth by 3 percent when their health declines to fair or worse. Hence, the cumulative
eﬀect of declining health from good or better to poor is the sum of these two coeﬃcients,
which is a 15 percent reduction in ﬁnancial and housing wealth. For households in very good
or better health, relatively small health shocks have essentially no impact on ﬁnancial and
housing wealth. Overall, how ﬁnancial and housing wealth responds to declining health in
the life-cycle model matches the empirical evidence in Table 7.
To understand the source of the decline in ﬁnancial and housing wealth, I decompose
the growth rate of ﬁnancial and housing wealth into the sum of three parts due to bonds,
stocks, and housing. Bonds and stocks account for 5 percent, and housing accounts for
7 percent of the 12 percent reduction in wealth when health declines from fair or better.
The fact that households primarily dissave from housing wealth in response to relatively
severe health shocks matches the empirical evidence in Table 7. However, the fact that
households reallocate from stocks to bonds in response to declining health is inconsistent
with the empirical evidence. Additional frictions, which I have ignored in this paper for
tractability, are likely to explain the absence of reallocation from stocks to bonds at the
two-year frequency.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 29
IV. Welfare Analysis of Relaxing Portfolio Constraints in the Life-Cycle
Model
A. Welfare Analysis of Relaxing Borrowing Constraints on Home Equity
In the benchmark model, the household can only borrow up to 20 percent of home value.
This section examines the welfare implications of relaxing the borrowing constraint on home
equity to be 60 percent of home value. This exercise can be interpreted as the impact of
ﬁnancial products such as reverse mortgages and home equity loans that relax borrowing
constraints for older households.
Table 11 reports out-of-pocket health expenditure, ﬁnancial and housing wealth, and its
allocation between bonds, stocks, and housing for simulated households. Relaxed borrowing
constraints do not have a signiﬁcant impact on health expenditure or the level of ﬁnan-
cial and housing wealth, compared to the benchmark model in Table 9. However, relaxed
borrowing constraints have a signiﬁcant impact on the allocation of ﬁnancial and housing
wealth. Households borrow from home equity, especially when young, to take advantage of
the equity premium. For example, households in good health at age 65 allocate −60 percent
of their ﬁnancial and housing wealth to bonds, 60 percent to stocks, and 100 percent to
housing.
I calculate the welfare gain as the ratio of the value function achieved with relaxed borrow-
ing constraints to that in the benchmark model, normalized to units of ﬁnancial and housing
wealth. As reported in Table 12, the welfare gain from relaxed borrowing constraints is 5
percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth for a household in good health at age 65. Healthier
households with longer life expectancy achieve higher welfare gains. The welfare gain is 4
percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth for households in poor health at age 65, and 7 percent
for those in good health.
B. Welfare Analysis of Private Annuitization
In the benchmark model, the household has only an implicit claim on a real annuity
through Social Security and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans. This section examines the welfare30
implications of allowing households to privately annuitize wealth. In this exercise, I adopt
two important institutional features of the annuity market in the United States. First, the
pricing of annuities depends on age but not on health. As a frictionless benchmark, I assume
that annuities are actuarially fair with respect to the Social Security life tables, having an
average return of 2.5 percent that matches the riskless interest rate. Second, annuitization
is irreversible, which amounts to a portfolio constraint B3,t ≥ B3,t−1 in each period t.
Table 13 reports out-of-pocket health expenditure, ﬁnancial and housing wealth, and its
allocation between bonds, stocks, housing, and annuities for simulated households. House-
holds reduce health expenditure and slightly increase ﬁnancial and housing wealth, relative
to the benchmark model in Table 9. For example, households in good health at age 77
spend 14 percent of income on health care, which is lower than 24 percent in the benchmark
model. Although markets are incomplete in the model, the endogenous response of health
expenditure to health shocks reduces the degree of market incompleteness. Consequently,
households annuitize most of their ﬁnancial and housing wealth, up to the borrowing con-
straint on home equity (Menahem E. Yaari 1965, Thomas Davidoﬀ, Jeﬀrey R. Brown and
Peter A. Diamond 2005). For example, households in good health at age 77 allocate −4p e r -
cent of their ﬁnancial and housing wealth to bonds, 27 percent to housing, and 77 percent
to annuities. Healthier households have a higher portfolio share in housing, due to the com-
plementarity between non-health consumption and health, which leads to a lower portfolio
share in annuities.
I calculate the welfare gain as the ratio of the value function achieved with private annuiti-
zation to that in the benchmark model, normalized to units of ﬁnancial and housing wealth.
As reported in Table 12, the welfare gain from private annuitization is 5 percent of ﬁnancial
and housing wealth for a household in good health at age 65. Healthier households with
longer life expectancy achieve higher welfare gains, partly because the pricing of annuities is
more advantageous for them. The welfare gain is 11 percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth
for households in poor health at age 65, and 17 percent for those in good health.
The life-cycle model has two elements that make the welfare gain from private annuitiza-PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 31
tion smaller than what it would otherwise be. First, housing wealth is more eﬃcient than
ﬁnancial wealth for self-insuring longevity risk because of the utility ﬂow from living in a
home (Thomas Davidoﬀ 2010). Second, the household can endogenously reduce health ex-
penditure, which reduces the utility cost of a wealth shortfall in old age (see Samuel Marshall,
Kathleen M. McGarry and Jonathan S. Skinner (2010) for empirical evidence). There are
two additional elements, turned oﬀ in my exercise for clarity, that can further reduce the wel-
fare gain from private annuitization: a stronger bequest motive (Benjamin M. Friedman and
Mark J. Warshawsky 1990, Joachim Inkmann, Paula Lopes and Alexander Michaelides 2011)
and annuities that are not actuarially fair (Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J.
Warshawsky and Jeﬀrey R. Brown 1999).
V. Conclusion
This paper has shown that a life-cycle model, in which health expenditure and saving
decisions respond endogenously to health shocks, can explain the cross-sectional variation
and the joint dynamics of health expenditure, health, and wealth in the Health and Re-
tirement Study. There are a number of potentially interesting extensions for future work.
First, the life-cycle problem can be generalized to encompass married households, so that
health expenditure and saving decisions depend on the health and survival of both partners
(Lee A. Lillard and Yoram Weiss 1997, Lena Jacobson 2000, David A. Love 2010). Second,
the life-cycle problem can be extended to include the working phase prior to retirement.
A number of interesting issues then arise such as the correlation between health and labor
income (Julien Hugonnier, Florian Pelgrin and Pascal St-Amour 2009) and the endogenous
response of labor supply to both public and employer-provided health insurance (David M.
Blau and Donna B. Gilleskie 2008, Eric French and John Bailey Jones 2011). Finally, the
life-cycle model can be used for welfare analysis of insurance products other than annuities
such as life insurance, Medigap insurance, long-term care insurance (Ralph S. J. Koijen,
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Motohiro Yogo 2011).32
Table 1—Health Problems and Health Care Utilization by Health Status
Health status
Poor Fair Good Very good Excellent
Panel A: Doctor-diagnosed health problems (percent of respondents)
High blood pressure 69 65 59 49 33
Diabetes 26 22 14 7 3
Cancer 22 18 15 13 10
Lung disease 23 14 8 5 3
Heart problems 54 39 26 15 9
Stroke 28 15 9 5 3
Psychiatric problems 30 20 13 8 6
Arthritis 78 73 65 55 40
Panel B: Some diﬃculty with activities of daily living (percent of respondents)
Bathing 45 18 8 4 2
Dressing 43 19 9 4 3
Eating 22 7 3 2 1
Panel C: Health care utilization (percent of respondents)
Doctor visit 98 97 96 94 91
Dentist visit 41 51 61 69 71
Home health care 34 17 9 5 3
Nursing home stay 19 8 5 3 2
Outpatient surgery 21 21 21 19 16
Prescription drugs 96 94 89 82 68
Cholesterol test 80 80 81 81 75
Mammogram 56 64 71 73 71
Note: Panel A reports the share of respondents who have ever had doctor-diagnosed health problems,
separately by health status. Panel B reports the share of respondents who have some diﬃculty with activities
of daily living at the time of interview, separately by health status. Panel C reports the share of respondents
who have used health care in the two years prior to the interview, separately by health status. The sample
consists of retired females who were born 1891–1940, aged 65 or older, and interviewed by the Health and
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Table 2—Estimating How Future Health Depends on Present Health and Health Invest-
ment
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Health status:
Poor -154.02 (-5.94) -118.08 (-4.45)
Fair -73.87 (-5.43) -62.82 (-4.42)
Very good 69.85 (6.25) 68.58 (6.04)
Excellent 135.36 (7.70) 131.04 (7.40)
(Age − 65)/10 -13.56 (-4.88) -7.87 (-2.79)
× Poor 14.21 (3.86) 10.50 (2.81)
× Fair 7.71 (2.60) 6.84 (2.28)
× Very good -3.77 (-1.18) -2.87 (-0.89)
× Excellent -16.13 (-2.78) -15.07 (-2.57)
Total wealth 8.85 (4.48) 7.81 (3.92)
× Poor -17.92 (-4.98) -17.42 (-4.82)
× Fair -6.38 (-2.29) -7.49 (-2.68)
× Very good 6.16 (2.03) 6.36 (2.09)
× Excellent 8.67 (1.67) 9.53 (1.83)
Doctor visit 0.04 (0.01) 2.74 (0.34)
× Poor 13.25 (0.58) 10.06 (0.43)
× Fair 14.59 (1.09) 13.30 (0.95)
× Very good -5.12 (-0.47) -6.28 (-0.57)
× Excellent 9.98 (0.61) 10.51 (0.64)
Dentist visit 8.95 (3.28) 7.24 (2.64)
× Poor 6.67 (1.22) 3.62 (0.66)
× Fair 1.70 (0.41) 1.03 (0.25)
× Very good 8.12 (1.81) 7.85 (1.75)
× Excellent 16.97 (1.93) 16.50 (1.87)
Home health care -25.22 (-4.96) -15.74 (-3.06)
× Poor -5.99 (-0.85) 0.86 (0.12)
× Fair 0.36 (0.05) 2.15 (0.32)
× Very good -13.89 (-1.44) -16.30 (-1.67)
× Excellent -24.89 (-1.07) -22.69 (-1.00)
Nursing home stay -14.56 (-1.61) -7.59 (-0.83)
× Poor -9.88 (-0.83) -6.92 (-0.57)
× Fair -14.14 (-1.18) -4.93 (-0.41)
× Very good -25.24 (-1.48) -22.48 (-1.33)
× Excellent -97.01 (-2.19) -96.88 (-2.22)
Outpatient surgery 2.58 (0.86) 4.45 (1.47)
× Poor 2.16 (0.37) -0.69 (-0.11)
× Fair -5.31 (-1.16) -5.05 (-1.09)
× Very good -0.93 (-0.19) -1.42 (-0.30)
× Excellent -4.33 (-0.45) -4.20 (-0.44)
Prescription drugs -17.58 (-4.21) -1.56 (-0.36)
× Poor 11.08 (0.83) 10.15 (0.77)
× Fair -10.87 (-1.29) -9.84 (-1.17)
× Very good -1.36 (-0.23) -6.36 (-1.07)
× Excellent -8.59 (-0.93) -16.81 (-1.82)34
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Cholesterol test 8.89 (2.46) 11.74 (3.23)
× Poor -12.76 (-1.84) -12.44 (-1.78)
× Fair -5.23 (-0.95) -5.56 (-1.00)
× Very good 0.67 (0.12) -0.46 (-0.08)
× Excellent -6.17 (-0.61) -6.15 (-0.61)
Mammogram 4.86 (1.52) 4.81 (1.49)
× Poor -0.39 (-0.07) -4.77 (-0.84)
× Fair -1.21 (-0.25) -1.63 (-0.34)
× Very good 0.66 (0.13) 1.58 (0.31)
× Excellent 5.35 (0.55) 4.70 (0.48)
Vigorous physical activity 18.89 (7.27) 15.14 (5.79)
× Poor -1.65 (-0.23) -8.85 (-1.20)
× Fair 3.52 (0.79) 2.05 (0.46)
× Very good 0.08 (0.02) 2.22 (0.56)
× Excellent 4.82 (0.66) 6.64 (0.91)
Smoking -16.94 (-3.78) -17.40 (-3.87)
× Poor 11.25 (1.44) 7.48 (0.94)
× Fair 4.63 (0.68) 2.85 (0.42)
× Very good -4.53 (-0.64) -4.64 (-0.66)
× Excellent -18.32 (-1.25) -18.97 (-1.30)
Doctor-diagnosed health problems:
High blood pressure -10.41 (-6.30)
Diabetes -19.79 (-9.24)
Cancer -15.98 (-7.37)
Lung disease -24.13 (-9.00)
Heart problems -16.30 (-9.00)
Stroke -7.72 (-2.85)
Psychiatric problems -10.24 (-4.67)
Arthritis -12.78 (-7.46)




Married -2.24 (-1.25) -3.38 (-1.87)
Birth cohort:
1891–1900 -98.19 (-4.96) -112.28 (-5.87)
1901–1910 -33.38 (-4.89) -43.93 (-6.34)
1911–1920 -7.57 (-2.02) -16.82 (-4.42)
1921–1930 1.67 (0.74) -4.13 (-1.80)
Wald test for health investment 505.50 (0.00) 300.62 (0.00)
Observations 20,557 20,434
Note: An ordered probit model is used to explain future health status at two years from the present interview.
The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients in percentage points and heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in
parentheses. The Wald test for the dependence of future health status on health investment includes measures
of health care utilization (i.e., doctor visit, dentist visit, home health care, nursing home stay, outpatient
surgery, prescription drugs, cholesterol test, and mammogram), vigorous physical activity, smoking, and
the interaction of these explanatory variables with present health status. The p-value for the Wald test is
reported in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females who were born 1891–1940, aged 65 or older,
and interviewed by the Health and Retirement Study during 1992–2006.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 35
Table 3—Estimating How Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure Relates to Health




Very good -6.99 (-1.59)
Excellent -8.26 (-1.25)
(Age − 65)/10 64.77 (23.78)
× Poor 3.35 (0.78)
× Fair 3.47 (1.06)
× Very good -6.22 (-1.98)
× Excellent -11.55 (-2.43)
Total wealth -29.66 (-11.77)
× Poor 8.45 (1.79)
× Fair 8.56 (2.30)
× Very good 0.38 (0.11)








Note: A linear regression model is used to explain the variation in the logarithm of out-of-pocket health
expenditure, as a share of income. The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients in percentage points and
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females who were born
1891–1940, aged 65 or older, and interviewed by the Health and Retirement Study during 1992–2006.36
Table 4—Health Expenditure and Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study
Health status Age
65 71 77 83 89
Panel A: Out-of-pocket health expenditure (percent of income)
P o o r 91 42 13 24 8
F a i r 81 21 82 74 0
G o o d 71 11 62 43 5
V e r y g o o d 71 01 42 02 8
Excellent 7 9 13 18 25
Panel B: Health distribution (percent of households)
Poor 7 9 11 13 16
Fair 20 22 24 26 28
Good 33 34 34 33 32
Very good 30 27 25 22 19
E x c e l l e n t 1 08754
Panel C: Financial and housing wealth (percent of total wealth)
Poor 19 25 31 37 43
Fair 19 25 32 38 45
Good 20 26 33 40 47
Very good 21 28 34 41 48
Excellent 23 29 36 43 50
Panel D: Bonds (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 19 29 38 45 52
Fair 12 23 32 40 47
Good 17 25 31 38 43
Very good 19 25 30 36 40
Excellent 14 20 25 30 34
Panel E: Stocks (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
P o o r 3568 1 0
F a i r 4579 1 1
G o o d 6 7 91 01 2
Very good 8 9 10 11 12
Excellent 8 9 10 11 12
Panel F: Housing (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 77 66 56 47 38
Fair 83 72 61 51 42
Good 77 68 60 52 45
Very good 73 66 60 53 47
Excellent 78 71 65 59 53
Note: Panel A reports the predicted values from the regression model in Table 3. Panel B reports the
predicted values from an ordered probit model that explains health status as a function of age, total wealth,
marital status, and birth cohort. Panel C reports the predicted values from the censored regression model
in Table 5. Panels E and F report predicted values from the censored regression model in Table 6. All
predicted values are for single females who were born 1931–1940 and have the average total wealth for her
cohort and age.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 37
Table 5—Estimating How Financial and Housing Wealth Relates to Health




Very good 1.89 (3.43)
Excellent 3.63 (4.30)
(Age − 65)/10 11.67 (33.54)
× Poor -1.80 (-3.61)
× Fair -0.47 (-1.17)
× Very good -0.37 (-0.92)
× Excellent -0.46 (-0.77)
Total wealth 15.72 (44.02)
× Poor 0.97 (1.46)
× Fair 0.18 (0.34)
× Very good -0.73 (-1.48)








Note: A censored regression model is used to explain the variation in housing and ﬁnancial wealth, as a
share of total wealth that includes the present value of retirement income. The table reports the estimated
elasticities in percentage points, at the mean of the explanatory variables, and heteroskedasticity-robust
t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females who were born 1891–1940, aged 65 or
older, and interviewed by the Health and Retirement Study during 1992–2006.38
Table 6—Estimating How the Portfolio Shares in Stocks and Housing Relate to Health
Explanatory variable Stocks Housing
Health status:
Poor -4.40 (-6.64) 0.54 (0.17)
Fair -3.29 (-5.86) 6.13 (2.72)
Very good 2.48 (3.99) -3.04 (-1.63)
Excellent 2.19 (2.45) 0.99 (0.39)
(Age − 65)/10 2.49 (7.09) -13.19 (-12.25)
× Poor 1.39 (2.32) -3.62 (-1.83)
× Fair 1.25 (2.82) -4.21 (-2.95)
× Very good -0.79 (-1.98) 2.30 (1.86)
× Excellent -0.63 (-1.13) 3.40 (2.11)
Total wealth 12.39 (42.32) 3.64 (4.27)
× Poor 1.51 (2.33) 12.79 (7.54)
× Fair 0.40 (0.84) 5.24 (3.90)
× Very good -0.82 (-2.01) -4.02 (-3.26)
× Excellent -0.97 (-1.79) -8.00 (-4.89)
Married -1.68 (-6.77) 5.73 (7.48)
Birth cohort:
1891–1900 -6.45 (-5.64) -27.86 (-5.00)
1901–1910 -4.82 (-9.70) -12.02 (-5.91)
1911–1920 -2.59 (-6.32) -6.56 (-4.93)
1921–1930 -0.56 (-1.83) -2.85 (-2.88)
Observations 31,689 31,689
Note: A censored regression model is used to explain the variation in the portfolio shares in stocks and
housing, as a share of ﬁnancial and housing wealth. The table reports the estimated elasticities in percentage
points, at the mean of the explanatory variables, and heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses.
The sample consists of retired females who were born 1891–1940, aged 65 or older, and interviewed by the
Health and Retirement Study during 1992–2006.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 39
Table 7—Estimating How Financial and Housing Wealth Responds to Declining Health
Explanatory variable Percent change in
Financial and Bonds Stocks Housing
housing wealth
Health declined from
Fair or better -12.79 -3.52 0.03 -9.30
(-2.59) (-0.97) (0.02) (-2.53)
Good or better -8.28 -4.67 -3.13 -0.48
(-2.83) (-2.28) (-2.77) (-0.22)
Very good or better -2.90 -7.74 -0.60 5.43
(-1.21) (-3.89) (-0.58) (2.62)
Excellent 3.07 2.05 0.80 0.22
(1.01) (0.98) (0.52) (0.11)
(Age − 65)/10 -9.37 -4.41 0.38 -5.34
(-6.63) (-3.78) (0.64) (-4.57)
Observations 21,054 21,054 21,054 21,054
Note: A linear regression model is used to explain the change in ﬁnancial and housing wealth over two
years, from the present interview to the next, and to decompose that change into the sum of the parts
due to bonds, stocks, and housing. The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients in percentage points and
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses. The sample consists of retired females who were born
1891–1940, aged 65 or older, and interviewed by the Health and Retirement Study during 1992–2006.40
Table 8—Parameters Used to Calibrate the Benchmark Model
Parameter Symbol Value
Preferences
Subjective discount factor β 0.96
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ 0.6
Relative risk aversion γ 5
Utility weight on housing φ 0.6
Utility weight on health α 0.01
Elasticity of substitution between non-health consumption and health ρ 0.5
Strength of the bequest motive u 1.0
Financial assets
Bond return R1 − 1 2.5%
Average stock return R2 − 1 6.5%
Standard deviation of stock returns σ2 18%
Housing
Depreciation rate δ 1.14%
Average housing return RD − 1 0.4%
Standard deviation of housing returns σD 3.5%
Borrowing limit λ 20%
Transaction cost τ 8%
Health
Average of log health μH −10
Standard deviation of log health σH 2
Returns to health investment ψ 0.21
Note: The life-cycle model is solved and simulated at a two-year frequency to match the frequency of
interviews in the Health and Retirement Study. The subjective discount factor, the average and standard
deviation of asset returns, and the depreciation rate are reported annually.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 41
Table 9—Health Expenditure and Wealth in the Benchmark Model
Health status Age
65 71 77 83 89
Panel A: Out-of-pocket health expenditure (percent of income)
Poor 91 91 105 115 123
Fair 33 45 54 62 68
Good 12 18 24 31 35
V e r y g o o d 25 81 11 2
Excellent 1 1 4 4 4
Panel B: Health distribution (percent of households)
P o o r 7 6778
Fair 20 18 20 22 24
Good 33 36 37 38 39
Very good 29 33 30 28 26
Excellent 10 7 6 5 4
Panel C: Financial and housing wealth (percent of total wealth)
Poor 15 25 34 40 43
Fair 17 27 36 43 46
Good 18 28 37 45 49
Very good 20 29 38 45 50
Excellent 22 30 38 46 50
Panel D: Bonds (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 20 29 28 30 33
F a i r 8 2 41 81 51 5
Good -2 7 5 5 7
Very good -9 -3 0 8 11
E x c e l l e n t - 1 2 - 6- 11 11 0
Panel E: Stocks (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 20 8 6 7 10
Fair 20 17 20 25 30
Good 20 24 26 32 37
Very good 27 26 24 26 28
Excellent 34 29 25 22 23
Panel F: Housing (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 59 63 66 63 57
Fair 71 59 62 60 54
Good 82 69 69 62 56
Very good 82 78 76 66 62
Excellent 79 77 76 66 67
Note: The solution of the life-cycle model is used to simulate a cross section of 100,000 households starting
at age 65. The table reports the mean of the relevant variable across the population of households that
remain alive at the given age. Table 8 reports the parameters of the life-cycle model.42
Table 10—How Financial and Housing Wealth Responds to Declining Health in the Bench-
mark Model
Explanatory variable Percent change in
Financial and Bonds Stocks Housing
housing wealth
Health declined from
Fair or better -11.98 12.48 -17.50 -6.97
Good or better -3.48 14.01 -8.02 -9.47
Very good or better -0.42 3.75 1.74 -5.91
Excellent 0.63 3.42 -2.44 -0.35
(Age − 65)/10 -2.14 -2.14 0.69 -0.69
Note: The solution of the life-cycle model is used to simulate a cross section of 100,000 households starting
at age 65. A linear regression model is used to explain the change in ﬁnancial and housing wealth over two
years, from one period to the next, and to decompose that change into the sum of the parts due to bonds,
stocks, and housing. The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients across the population of households that
remain alive at the given age. Table 8 reports the parameters of the life-cycle model.PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 43
Table 11—Health Expenditure and Wealth in a Life-Cycle Model with Relaxed Borrowing
Constraints on Home Equity
Health status Age
65 71 77 83 89
Panel A: Out-of-pocket health expenditure (percent of income)
Poor 86 94 110 123 131
Fair 25 48 57 66 72
G o o d 51 92 63 03 4
Very good 1 6 9 10 10
Excellent 0 2 4 3 3
Panel B: Health distribution (percent of households)
Poor 7 6 7 7 8
Fair 20 18 20 22 24
Good 33 36 37 38 39
Very good 29 33 30 28 26
E x c e l l e n t 1 07653
Panel C: Financial and housing wealth (percent of total wealth)
Poor 15 26 35 43 46
Fair 17 28 37 45 49
Good 19 29 39 47 52
Very good 21 30 39 48 53
Excellent 22 30 39 48 53
Panel D: Bonds (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor -29 9 26 33 33
Fair -24 3 10 13 12
Good -60 -17 -7 -4 -4
Very good -59 -28 -9 -4 -4
Excellent -42 -30 -5 -2 -3
Panel E: Stocks (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 59 20 19 20 21
Fair 50 33 39 44 45
Good 60 51 56 58 60
Very good 59 57 53 53 55
Excellent 56 58 48 48 50
Panel F: Housing (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 70 70 55 47 47
Fair 74 64 50 44 42
Good 100 67 52 46 44
Very good 100 71 55 51 49
Excellent 86 72 57 53 53
Note: The solution of a life-cycle model, in which the household can borrow up to 60 percent of home value,
is used to simulate a cross section of 100,000 households starting at age 65. The table reports the mean of
the relevant variable across the population of households that remain alive at the given age. The parameters
of the life-cycle model are the same as those for the benchmark model in Table 8, except for λ =0 .6.44
Table 12—Welfare Analysis of Relaxing Portfolio Constraints in the Life-Cycle Model





Very good 7 20
Excellent 7 17
Note: Welfare gain is expressed as the share of ﬁnancial and housing wealth at age 65 in the benchmark
model. The borrowing limit is 60 percent of home value in the life-cycle model with relaxed borrowing
constraints on home equity. The average annuity return is 2.5 percent in the life-cycle model with private
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Table 13—Health Expenditure and Wealth in a Life-Cycle Model with Private Annuitiza-
tion
Health status Age
65 71 77 83 89
Panel A: Out-of-pocket health expenditure (percent of income)
Poor 76 69 77 81 96
Fair 19 30 35 36 41
G o o d 5 1 11 41 41 5
V e r y g o o d 1 3555
E x c e l l e n t 0 1333
Panel B: Health distribution (percent of households)
Poor 7 7 7 8 10
Fair 20 18 21 23 26
Good 33 36 37 39 39
Very good 29 33 29 26 23
E x c e l l e n t 1 0 7542
Panel C: Financial and housing wealth (percent of total wealth)
Poor 15 27 38 49 61
Fair 18 29 39 51 63
Good 19 30 40 52 64
Very good 20 30 40 52 64
Excellent 22 30 41 52 64
Panel D: Bonds (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor -3 -2 -2 -1 0
Fair -9 -5 -3 -3 -1
G o o d - 1 6 - 8- 4- 4- 3
Very good -15 -10 -5 -4 -3
Excellent -13 -12 -6 -4 -3
Panel E: Stocks (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
P o o r 1 8 4100
F a i r 2 6 3100
G o o d 3 4 4000
V e r y g o o d 3 0 6000
E x c e l l e n t 3 3 9000
Panel F: Housing (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 53 39 23 16 10
Fair 63 43 24 20 13
Good 82 50 27 20 16
Very good 84 57 33 20 16
Excellent 79 62 37 20 16
Panel G: Annuities (percent of ﬁnancial and housing wealth)
Poor 32 59 78 84 89
Fair 20 59 78 83 88
G o o d 0 5 47 78 48 7
V e r y g o o d 1 4 77 28 48 7
E x c e l l e n t 1 4 16 98 48 7
Note: The solution of a life-cycle model, in which the household can save in annuities at an average return
of 2.5 percent, is used to simulate a cross section of 100,000 households starting at age 65. The table reports
the mean of the relevant variable across the population of households that remain alive at the given age.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Relative Price of Health Care
Note: This ﬁgure reports the relative price of health care, calculated through equation (33) with q =0 .019.
A censored regression model is used to estimate how the out-of-pocket expenditure share depends on health
status, age and its interaction with health status, total wealth and its interaction with health status, marital
status, and birth cohort. The predicted values for single females, who were born 1931–1940 and have the
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A. Deﬁnition of Variables Using the Health and Retirement Study
Most of the variables are based on the RAND HRS (Version I), which is produced by the
RAND Center for the Study of Aging with funding from the National Institute on Aging
and the Social Security Administration. Out-of-pocket health expenditure is the sum of
out-of-pocket health expenditure from the RAND HRS and payments of health insurance
premiums. Out-of-pocket health expenditure from the RAND HRS is the total amount paid
for hospitals, nursing homes, doctor visits, dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription
drugs, home health care, and special facilities. Payments of health insurance premiums are
the sum of premiums paid for Medicare/Medicaid HMO, private health insurance, long-term
care insurance, and prescription drug coverage (i.e., Medicare Part D). I convert the pre-
mium reported at monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual frequency to the total implied
p a y m e n to v e rt w oy e a r s .
Retirement income is the sum of labor income, employer pension and annuity income, So-
cial Security disability and supplemental security income, Social Security retirement income,
and unemployment or workers compensation. I calculate after-tax income by subtracting
federal income tax liabilities, estimated through the NBER TAXSIM program (Version 9). I
calculate the present value of retirement income as after-tax income times the price of a real
annuity, matched to the female respondent by birth cohort and age. I calculate the price
of a real annuity through equation (10), using the survival probabilities for females in the
Social Security life tables (Bell and Miller 2005, Table 7) and a riskless interest rate of 2.5
percent.
Bonds consist of checking, savings, and money market accounts; CD, government savings
bonds, and T-bills; bonds and bond funds; and an imputed value of bonds in IRA and Keogh
accounts. Because the portfolio allocation in IRA and Keogh accounts is not known, I impute
the portfolio share in bonds for each household to be the same as that in non-retirement
accounts. I subtract the value of liabilities from the value of bonds. Liabilities consist all
mortgages for primary and secondary residence, other home loans for primary residence, and
other debt. Stocks consist of businesses; stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts; and54
an imputed value of stocks in IRA and Keogh accounts. Housing consists of primary and
secondary residence.
B. Numerical Solution of the Consumption and Portfolio-Choice Problem
I discretize health   Ht into ﬁve grid points, spaced to match the lognormal distribution for
health at age 65. I discretize retirement income   B3,t into nine grid points, equally spaced
between 0.1 and 0.9. I discretize the housing stock   Dt into nine grid points, equally spaced
between 0.1 and 0.9. I discretize the home price Pt into ﬁve grid points, equally spaced on
a logarithmic scale between 1 and 1.5. I calculate the transition probabilities between these
ﬁve grid points to match the moments for housing returns. Finally, I discretize the lognormal
shock for stock returns ν2,t into ﬁve grid points, spaced so that each grid point realizes with
equal probability. I chose the ﬁneness of the state space after some experimentation to
minimize computation time without sacriﬁcing accuracy.
Because the household dies with certainty in period t = 28 (i.e., age 119), its value function
in that period is given by equation (24). For each period t<28 and at each grid point in
the state space, I solve the problem recursively through the following algorithm.
1) Suppose that paying the transaction cost to change the housing stock is optimal (i.e.,
  AD,t  =   Dt). Find the policies   Ct,   It,a n d   An,t (n =2 ,3,D) that maximizes the objective
function, using numerical interpolation to evaluate the value function in period t +1 .
2) If   A3,t+(1−λ)   AD,t ≥ 1, the policies from step 1 must be optimal because the household
must reduce the housing stock to satisfy the budget constraint. Otherwise, proceed to
step 3.
3) Suppose that avoiding the transaction cost by keeping the present housing stock is
optimal (i.e.,   AD,t =   Dt). Find the policies   Ct,   It,a n d   An,t (n =2 ,3) that maximizes
the objective function, using numerical interpolation to evaluate the value function in
period t +1 .
4) Compare the value of the objective function achieved in steps 1 and 3. The policy thatPORTFOLIO CHOICE IN RETIREMENT 55
achieves the higher value is the optimal policy.
The use of analytical partial derivatives of the objective function makes the numerical
optimization routine faster and more accurate than it would otherwise be. The partial
derivative of the objective function with respect to consumption is
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The partial derivative of the objective function with respect to health expenditure is
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The partial derivative of the objective function with respect to savings in asset n =2 ,3i s
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Finally, the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to savings in housing
wealth is
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